Abstract-This paper discusses implementation issues related to using relational databases as storage when implementing privacy preserving secure logs. In these types of logs it is important to keep the unlinkability properties of log entries intact when the entries are stored. We briefly describe the concept of privacy preserving secure logging and give the rational for it. The problems of using relational database systems as storage is discussed and we suggest three solutions to the problem. Two of the solutions are analyzed and compared and we show that at least one of the solutions is feasible in a real live setting and that the added overhead of the solution is very small .
People of today spend a lot of time on the Internet consuming anything from work related to leisure related services. In this process a lot of personal information is given to different organizations, companies and governmental bodies. This development in combination with the social networks and the envisioned future with ambient intelligence and sensor networks implies that it becomes easier and easier to gather information on individuals and to profile users. This state of affairs has led some scholars to argue that the old paradigm of concealment of data is not enough but that it needs to be paired with a transparency paradigm [1] [2] [3] , making it possible for users to reliably find out what information about them is stored, where that information came from and how it is processed.
The tools needed to accomplish these things have been named Transparency Enhancing Technologies (TETs) and are still in their advanced forms in its infancy [1, 4] . One part of transparency in a privacy setting is, for a data subject, to be able to see how her data have been used (i.e. accessed or processed in other ways). In order to accomplish this, a 1 Part of the research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n°216483. The information in this document is provided "as is", and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The above referenced consortium members shall have no liability for damages of any kind including without limitation direct, special, indirect, or consequential damages that may result from the use of these materials subject to any liability which is mandatory due to applicable law. log system is needed to track the use of data. If this log system is not constructed with privacy in mind it may leak personal information to unauthorized entities or itself store new personal information in the logging process. In order to address this transparency need we have, within the frame of the PrimeLife 2 EU-project, developed and implemented a privacy preserving secure log system. The log system is an extension of a Kelsey-Schneier log [5] adding privacy enhancement, primarily unlinkability 3 of log entries and anonymous access to log entries. The unlinkability property is important because it makes it harder (or even impossible) for an attacker to correlate events and data belonging to a data subject. Such correlation may result in an attacker being able to profile or track a data subject or even break possible anonymity of the data subject in some cases. The log system has been implemented and integrated into the PRIME privacy enhanced identity management system [8] . Even though the log system was implemented as a proof of concept there are still some issues that need to be addressed further in order to make the log practically usable in a large scale environment. One of those issues is how to preserve the overall unlinkability of log entries when they are actually stored within a database system; primarily how to prevent correlation between stored entries and other types of logs in the service environment. This paper presents and analyzes some suggestions on how to address this problem. In particular we have evaluated and analyzed the performance impacts of the proposed solutions.
Regarding secure logs there exists a number of solutions described in the literature e.g., [3, 5, 9, 10] . However, none of these solutions fully addresses the problem of unlinkability and anonymous access. Some work of unlinkability in connection with logs have been addressed by [11] . However, this work primarily addresses the unlinkability of logs between logging systems in a eGovernment setting rather than unlinkability of log entries within a log. Further, they do not address the problem of an inside attacker or provide anonymous access to log entries.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives and overview of the privacy preserving log system. Section 3 outlines the problems and issues related to actual storage of the log and section 4 presents possible solutions to the issues. In section 5 the solutions are analyzed and discussed. Finally, section 6 concludes and provides ideas on future work.
II. A PRIVACY PRESERVING SECURE LOGGING MODULE
This section starts with explaining what a secure and a privacy preserving secure log is. Next the implementation of a privacy preserving secure logging module will be briefly described, focusing on the database used to store log entries. A full description of the design and rational for privacy preserving secure logging system can be found in [12] .
A. A Secure Log
A secure log protects the confidentiality and integrity of the entries in the log. The confidentiality is provided by encrypting the entries, which prevents an attacker from reading the contents. The integrity is provided by using hashes and MACs, which allows detection of any changes made to the entries. Furthermore, secure logs are concerned with the security of the log entries committed to the log prior to an attacker compromising the logging system (sometimes referred to as "forward secrecy"); once compromised generally little can be done to secure future commits to the log.
All the security properties, described in the previous paragraph, ultimately comes from a core secret A o , which is hashed to form an authentication key for each entry in the log. For the entry with index i the authentication key is defined as A i = hash(A i−1 ). As soon as an authentication key is used the next key is generated, overwriting and irretrievably deleting the previous key.
The Kelsey-Schneier secure [5] log was used as a foundation for the privacy preserving secure log described in the following section. In the secure log as described by Kelsey-Schneier, the key used to encrypt the data in each log entry is derived from the authentication key. A hash together with a MAC, keyed with the authentication key, provides cumulative verification; by verifying the integrity of an entry, the integrity of all previously committed entries in the log is verified as well. This is done by having the value of the hash depend not only on the other fields in that entry but also on the value of the hash in the previous entry in the log.
B. A privacy preserving Secure Log
A privacy preserving secure log, in addition to the properties described for a secure log above, takes into consideration the privacy of the data subjects for whom the log entries concerns. This is done mainly by: 1) Storing the data in a log in such a way that it ensures that only the data subject for whom the entry concerns can interpret the contents.
2) Allowing each data subject to independently verify the integrity of the log entries concerning them. 3) Providing a high degree of unlinkability between log entries and data subjects. The first requirement is realized by using public-key cryptography using a self signed public-key belonging to the data subject to encrypt the data in the log entries. Requirement 2 requires that we introduce an authentication key for each data subject. The authentication key for the entry with index i for the data subject in question 4 is defined as DSS i = hash(DSS i−1 ). Where DSS 0 is a value randomly generated by the data subject. The authentication key for the data subject is used to key a MAC, called the data subject chain, which allows cumulative verification of the log entries belonging to that data subject. The data subject chain for the i:th entry in the log for the data subject is defined as
The EntryID field will be explained in the following paragraph.
In a secure log, such as the one described by KelseySchneier, it is is implicitly assumed that the entries in the log are stored chronologically. In a privacy preserving secure log the entries are assumed to be stored in a multiset, log
where n is the number of entries in the log and E i the i:th entry in the log for a data subject defined as
A subset of the entries can be ordered in chronological order by each data subject through the generation of the entry identifier that is part of each entry. The entry identifier is defined as EntryID i = hash(EntryID i−1 , DSS i ) for the i:th entry in the log for the data subject. For the first entry in the log for each data subject, since there is no previous entry identifier per definition, an agreed upon random seed is used.
Assuming a reasonable number of data subjects and log entries, requirement 3 depends ultimately on the secrecy of the authentication key and corresponding private key for each log entry. It is worth noting that, in addition to keeping track of the current authentication key for each data subject, the logging system needs to keep track of the latest entry identifier and data subject chain for each data subject in order to generate new entries. This means that an attacker can always link the latest entry in the log for each data subject to the respective data subject.
C. The Implementation
A privacy preserving secure logging module has been implemented and integrated into the PRIME Core; a software prototype has been developed in the PrimeLife project. The development of the logging module is described in [13] . The implementation is written in Java and uses the HSQLDB relation database for storing the entries in the log. HSQLDB supports a number of different table types, the cached and text types being two of them. The cached table type stores its data on disk, using a binary format, with parts of its data cached in memory. It is possible to configure how often the data that are cached in memory is synchronized with the data on disk and how large the cache should be. Text tables work just like cached tables, with the exception of the data format being a CSV (Comma-Separated Values) file, where each line contains an entry. Text tables also offer a useful feature, the ability to disconnect and reconnect a table from its data source (the file on disk). When a table is reconnected HSQLDB will recreate its cache and any indexes, detecting modifications made.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
To guarantee the unlinkability properties in the log it is important to keep the set properties of the entries in the implementation. Failing to do this, e.g., by storing the entries in sequence of creation (i.e., chronologically) might make it possible for an attacker to correlate the log with external logs, and with a certain probability be able to correctly guess the data subject to which the entry refers to, content of the entry or how the data was processed and by whom. External logs will most likely be present in the majority of modern computer systems created by applications or by the operating system itself. Consequently the actual storage method used must not keep any chronologically sequential state accessible by anyone that does not know the secrets used to generate the entry.
An example to highlight the problem would be a log keeping a detailed record of how personally identifiable information given to a social networking site is processed and handed out to the web application. The web application is running on the Apache web server, which is keeping a detailed access log of all requests processed by the server. Imagine the following entry in the access log: "127.0.0.1 -bob [23/Feb/2010:13:55:36 -0700] "GET /profile.php?id=5 HTTP/1.0" 200 2326". A request for the profile of the user with identifier 5 would generate a log entry detailing which information was given to the web application (e.g. name, friends and profile picture), why it was handed out etc. If an attacker could correlate the log with the access log she could potentially link the log entry to a data subject (the one with identifier 5, shown in the picture at that URL) together with figuring out much of the contents of the entry.
Given the intended use of the log we wanted to be able to gain the advantages that database systems provide over plain file storage when implementing the log. Since we did not want to implement a full database system from scratch it was desirable to use a commercial of the shelf (COTS) system. One general problem in this context of general purpose database systems is that they usually store meta information on the order of insertion and sequences of database commands in order to be able to recover from computer failures or for other purposes. Further, insertions in the actual database file seems to be made in sequence. These properties are in direct conflict with what we want to achieve. In order to overcome this two properties needs to be fulfilled. The first is that the database system used must be configurable in such a way that generation of meta data can be controlled, and secondly there need to be a way of destroying the sequential order of the database file. In order to be usable, the solution must also do this in a reasonable time and be scalable. The chosen database system HSQLDB fulfills the first property and in the following section we will discuss possible solutions to the second property.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS This section will describe three possible solutions to the problem outlined in section 3. All three solutions have in common that they take a database of log entries and randomizes the order of the entries in some way, with the goal of destroying the chronological order in which HSQLDB inserts the entries. We refer to the act of randomizing the order of the entries as a shuffle, analogous to shuffling a deck of cards.
A. Version 1: In-line Shuffle
Each time a new entry is added there is a configurable chance that a shuffle will be triggered. A shuffle swaps the position of most entries in a HSQLDB text table source file. The shuffle is done in the following steps: 1) Disconnect the table from its data source.
2) There are two files involved; the original data source and a newly created temporary one. Starting from the top of the original file, for each line toss a coin and do one of two things: a) Write the line to the temporary file. b) Write the line to a buffer. 3) Shuffle the order of the entries in the buffer. 4) Write the entries in the buffer to the end of the temporary file. 5) Replace the original file with the temporary file. 6) Reconnect the table to the newly shuffled data source. While the described steps do modify the data source, exactly how randomized the data source ends up being over time is unclear.
B. Version 2: Threaded Shuffle
The threaded shuffle, like the in-line shuffle, has a probability of being triggered every time an entry is added to the log. Once triggered a new shuffle thread is spawned, leaving the main thread to continue its execution. The main thread and the shuffle thread share a coordinator object.
1) The coordinator: The coordinator coordinates the access to the table containing all the log entries. It contains one flag and two locks:
• The active flag is set to true when a shuffle thread is running and false otherwise.
• The read lock is acquired to be allowed to read from the table in question while the active flag is set to true.
• The write lock is acquired to be allowed to write to the table in question while the active flag is set to true.
2) Modifications to get and add methods:
The methods for getting and adding an entry from the log has to be modified to take into account the coordinator object. When the coordinator is active the table containing the log entries is not to be modified by anyone else than the shuffler thread. There is still a possibility that new entries are added to the log while the shuffler thread is running. For this reason, all attempts to add an entry to the log while the coordinator is active will result in the entry being placed in a temporary buffer.
The get method, in the case of the coordinator being active, always acquires the read lock before retrieving an entry from the log or the buffer. The add method, when the coordinator is active, will acquire the write lock before writing the new entry to the buffer.
3) The shuffler thread: The shuffle is done in the following steps:
1) Create an empty text table.
2) Get all the entries in the log, ordered by entry identifier and insert them into the internal table created in step 1. 3) Acquire the write lock. 4) Insert all the entries in the buffer (the entries that were inserted during the execution of the shuffler thread) into the internal table. 5) Acquire the read lock. 6) Disconnect the internal table from its data source and then disconnect the log's data source as well. Replace the log's data source with the internal table's data source. 7) Reconnect the log to its data source, which is now shuffled, and deactivate the coordinator (resulting in all locks being released). As a result of the process presented above, the data source ends up to a high degree being sorted based upon the entry identifier. In section 2, the entry identifier was defined as the cryptographic hash of the previous entry identifier and the data subject's authentication key. Since the authentication keys are secret, and due to the properties of a cryptographic hash, this results in the table being sorted based on an apparently random value to anyone without knowledge of the authentication keys used. By inspecting the data source it is clear which entries have been shuffled. How many entries on average that are not sorted depends on the shuffle rate, a configurable value. We believe this outcome to be more clear than the one generated by the in-line shuffle.
C. Version 3: Threaded Table-Swap Shuffle
The threaded table-swap shuffle is triggered like the threaded shuffle. It is also running in its own thread, uses the same coordinator and requires the same modifications to the get and add methods. Instead of having the shuffler thread creating a new shuffled data source, as done in the threaded shuffle, the threaded table-swap shuffle works by having two tables for storing log entries.
1) Further modifications:
The get and add methods are further modified, beyond what is described from the threaded shuffle, to check a variable for which of the two log tables to read from or add to respectively. We refer to the current table to read or write from as the active 2) The shuffler thread: The shuffle is done in the following steps:
1) Call insertDB.
2) Get the write lock.
3) Call insertBuffer. 4) Get the read lock. 5) Call dropAndSwap. 6) Deactivate the coordinator, releasing all locks.
V. EVALUATION
This section presents the evaluation of the different suggested solutions and analyzes the result of the evaluation. Version three of the shuffler is still work in progress so it will not be analyzed here. However, we expect that the results for version 3 is similar as the result for version 2 with the exception that, due to the fact that it does not need to detach the database file, it will work better for large numbers of entries.
A. Experimental setup
The experiments were based upon a custom interface and class written in Java; the TestObject interface and the TestPerformance class. The TestObject interface declares three methods:
• The init(int start) method initializes the test object to the state needed before testing can begin. The start parameter specifies the initial number of entries that should be in the database.
• The perform method performs the actual action we want to benchmark.
• The cleanup method properly cleans up every modification made as a result of calling init and perform multiple times. The TestPerformance class has two methods:
• The TestPerformance(String name) constructor takes as argument the name of a class which implements the TestObject interface.
• The test(int min, int max, int repetitions) method creates a new instance of the class given to the constructor, passing the min parameter to the init method of the TestObject and then calls perform max number of times. This is repeated as many times as the repetition parameter specifies. The method returns a matrix with the time it took to perform each call to perform in milliseconds. To conduct our experiments we simply implemented the TestObject interface for each class we wanted to test and used the TestPerformance class to conduct the actual measurements.
B. Initial Performance Comparison
In order to get an understanding of the difference in performance between the solutions we first did a comparison of the two first solutions in order to find out if any of the solutions performed significantly better or worse than the other. The experiment was conducted by inserting an entry for different sizes of the database file. With size in this case we refer to the number of entries currently stored in the database when the new entry is inserted. The size of the database was varied between 0 and 100 entries. 10 repetitions of entry insertion for each size was performed and the mean value of insertion time was calculated for each database size.
The result of the experiment is depicted in Figure 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows insertion times with and without cryptography and with and without version 1 of the shuffler. The scale factor mentioned is a value controlling the cache size of the HSQLDB. This value is, unless otherwise stated, set to 10. 
C. Performance Impact of the Shuffler in an Insertion
Analyzing Figure 2 and comparing results with and without encryption, there is an definite increase in insertion time when encryption is used. Clearly, most of the increase seems to be due to the encryption itself with the shuffler adding only minor overhead. In order to understand how the increase in time between different activities connected with an insertion was distributed, we decided to measure the time spent in each activity. We broke down the method that adds an entry to the log into six parts, timing how long it took to complete each. This test was then run 1000 times, with the average time presented in Figure 3 . Examining this figure reveals that the bulk of the time used to insert an entry is spent updating the different secrets of the log followed by key retrieval and signing. The actual storage and thus the part where the shuffler is involved comprises a small part of the actual insertion time. Consequently our initial assumption that the encryption added the most of the time was wrong. However, the assumption that the shuffler adds a minor contribution was verified. As a side effect of the result we were able to rewrite the secret update procedure, mainly replacing old proof of concept code with new approaches learned throughout our work, significantly reducing the time spent there (see Figure 4 and 5). 
D. Performance of Larger Sizes of the Database
In order to fully verify that version 2 performed in constant time over a larger database file, we vary the size of the database between 0 and 1000 entries. The experiment was carried out as the experiment described in 5.B with the exception that the size of the database was larger and the fact Figure 6 . Again, the scale factor is a value determining the size of the HSQLDB cache, defined as 3 * 2 scale rows. When examining the graph one can clearly see that version 2 behaves constant up to around a size of 250 entries in the database where it makes a steep rise in insertion time and seems to start growing linearly. Analyzing the graph further there seems to be no significant difference between the cases with and without the shuffler, all other values held constant. This state of affairs lead us to believe that something else was behind the dramatic increase at 250 entries. In this case, we suspected the cache or rather the cache size. To verify this, we performed the same experiment again, but this time increasing the scale factor (and thus the cache size) to 11. The result is presented in Figure 7 . In this graph, the insertion time is constant over all the database sizes thus verifying the assumption that when HSQLDB runs out of cache, the performance goes down and that the shuffler adds negligible overhead.
Furthermore, figure 6 and 7 shows a significant drop in average insertion time together with the shuffler adding relatively less overhead than seen in figure 4. As part of running the experiment for figure 6 and 7 we changed the write delay property of HSQLDB to 100ms from its previous 0ms value.
The write delay property specifies the delay for changes made in memory to be synchronized with disk. This slight sacrifice in reliability clearly offers significant gains in performance. In this paper, we have discussed the specific implementation issue of preserving the unlinkability property of a privacy preserving secure log when using a regular relational database system, in this case HSQLDB, as record storage. We have discussed the problems that using relational databases, in this case, give rise to. Three possible solutions to the problem is presented. In order to evaluate the solutions we have conducted performance experiments on two of the solutions and compared the results. Through the experiments we have shown that at least one of these solutions are feasible in a real live setting and that the performance impact of this solution is minor. The third solution is still work in progress and has only been described here for completeness reasons. However, we do believe that the performance of the third solution is similar to that of the second one. Future work in the area will concentrate on evaluating the third solution to verify that our assumptions on the performance and to generalize the work beyond HSQLDB. We believe that the solution will work on
